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 Is Africa becoming more democratic in the 1990's?  A sharp 
increase in multiparty democracy might seem to attest to the 
victory of democracy in Africa -- unless the presence of 
multiparty democracy alone may not be a sufficient indicator of 
the status of democracy.  Thirty years ago, Arendt criticized 
both multiparty and one-party democracy, advocating a more 
grassroots involvement in localized politics.  In the 1960's, 
Fanon and other African critics likewise criticized what party 
politics was doing to the newly-independent states of Africa. 
_______________________________________________________________  
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Since 1990, Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba of University of Dar-Es-
Saalam has written several articles from a contemporary African 
angle, suggesting criticisms of multiparty and one-party 
democracy that parallel Arendt's analysis.   
 Wamba-dia-Wamba is an important and influential scholar who 
specializes in the history of ideas as well as the history of 
political economy.  He has recently spent several years as 
President of the Executive Committee of CODESRIA (Council for 
the Development of Social Science Research in Africa).  In his 
work for the past ten years with CODESRIA, he has coordinated 
research on social movements, social transformation, and 
democracy in Africa, recently resulting in an edited collection 
of research articles.1  In addition, Wamba-dia-Wamba served as 
East Africa Editor for Quest:  Philosophical Discussions, An 
International African Journal of Philosophy from 1988-1996.  
This journal has been an important communication medium for 
philosophical ideas concerning Africa.  Wamba-dia-Wamba often 
used his role as editor to instigate debate on issues of Africa 
and democracy, publishing articles on the topic and inviting 
others to respond in subsequent issues in the journal.  Wamba-
dia-Wamba was also a key presenter at a conference held in 1993 
at Erasmus University of Rotterdam regarding the process of 
democratization in Africa since 1989.  Several African and 
European philosophers commented on Wamba-dia-Wamba's ideas at 
that time, and the papers have been collected into a book.2     
 Wamba-dia-Wamba argues that while the IMF/World Bank 
stipulates that one-party systems must be replaced with 
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multiparty ones, people's real political emancipation gets lost 
in the shuffle.   While Wamba-dia-Wamba favors people's 
political movements, which he thinks can draw upon a traditional 
African paradigm of community involvement, one wonders if such 
movements can act as viable alternatives to parties, especially 
when the present global political consensus recognizes no 
alternatives to the modern State.   
Several African scholars have responded to Wamba-dia-
Wamba's provocative statements, mostly to cheer him on and echo 
his complaints about current developments.  Some elaborate on 
the various aspects of African political traditions which could 
serve as models for African alternatives.  This is all well and 
good; but none of the commentators seriously analyzes the role 
of Party and State as Wamba-dia-Wamba does.  Some of the critics 
understood him as advocating the rejection of Western ideas and 
a return to past traditions of African politics.  However, 
Wamba-dia-Wamba has clarified his position, denying he suggests 
a return to the past.  Yet he does not reject movements which 
"creatively reactivate ideas which once emerged in the past..."3 
Neither does he reject all ideas from the West, thus escaping 
Wiredu's charge that he rejects all Western ideas "other than 
the particular version of Marxist-Leninism which is music to his 
ears."4  Rather, Wamba-dia-Wamba, in critiquing socialist and 
one-party states, should impress Wiredu by his commitment to 
look critically at all ideas, indigenous or foreign, and to 
decide whether they are appropriate for contemporary Africa - a 
methodology for "conceptual decolonization" that Wiredu suggests 
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himself.    
 Accordingly, this paper will analyze and compare Arendt's 
and Wamba-dia-Wamba's paradigms of politics.  Its author is 
confident that the resulting dialogue of ideas will help 
Africans who seek alternatives to both multiparty and one-party 
States.  Although Wamba-dia-Wamba does not mention Arendt's 
ideas anywhere in his work, the parallels in thinking and 
strategy are extensive enough to warrant comment and evaluation. 
 A look at both thinkers' works will suggest tentative models 
for the form democracy would best take in Africa, and perhaps 
even the rest of the world.  Their points of agreement will 
suggest that most existing democratic systems are far from the 
ideal of government of, by, and for the people.  The functioning 
of the State, which lies behind all forms of parliamentarian and 
party politics, must be challenged by people's emancipative 
movements. 
   
Wamba-dia-Wamba and Arendt on Party Politics 
 At present, many African states have been pressured to 
adopt multiparty politics to supplant previous one-party or 
military rule (for example, in Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Zimbabwe, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon).  This pressure comes from 
international aid and loan agencies like the IMF and the World 
Bank.  Although a great many Africans definitely wish the 
dictatorial regimes would go, they have mixed feelings about the 
multiparty scenarios that are in some countries replacing them. 
As Wamba-dia-Wamba notes, no one has bothered to analyze why 
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multiparty politics failed in Africa in the 60's.  Historically, 
one after one, parties put in power by multiparty elections 
dissolved the opposition parties and ruthlessly consolidated 
their power, creating one-party states (as in Kenya, Benin, 
Cameroon, and Zaire).  In addition, some multiparty and one-
party states suffered military coups (such as Nigeria, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, and Uganda).  Although human rights organizations 
rightly express outrage at the summary executions and 
imprisonment without trial that often accompanied one-party 
consolidation, the belief that the solution lies in restoring 
multiparty rule is perhaps too facile.  Such thinking, and such 
easy capitulation to international bodies, according to Wamba-
dia-Wamba, threatens to fetishize the State.  The State is seen 
as needing to be kept intact and in the parliamentarian mold, 
since it is needed to collect currently vital international aid.5 
  
 He argues that even in Europe multiparty politics has the 
same negative consequences one finds in Africa.  While parties 
are supposed to coalesce around certain political ideals and 
values, their practical foundation is otherwise.  In Italy and 
Japan, he suggests, we see evidence that "most of the self-
styled parties are not parties at all, but clientelist, family 
and corruption based state organizations."6  Multipartyism is 
now, whether in Europe or Africa, just a state organization to 
divide up positions in government.  Regardless of evidence of 
problems with the political setup, there remains a Western 
arrogance that the "First World" is doing it right, and the rest 
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of the world must catch up.  Democracy is thus seen by the 
politically dominant countries as a "frozen model" to export 
everywhere.7 
 Hannah Arendt notes as well the checkered career of 
multiparty democracy.  The party system in Europe had been 
short-lived; it began in Europe in the 19th century, mostly 
after 1848, and lasted only about forty years.  By the time 
Hitler came to power, most European countries had adopted some 
form of dictatorship and discarded the party system.  Americans 
were embarrassed to admit this fact and tried to overlook it, 
insisting that the party system be reinstated in Europe after 
the Second World War, because it had "worked" in the United 
States.  The reasons for its failure in Europe are complex.  
According to Arendt, people became frustrated with the party 
system, and were attracted to mass movements which claimed to 
operate outside it. Like Wamba-dia-Wamba, Arendt states that the 
problem with multiparty systems is that each party is formed 
around private interest.  Whichever party one belongs to, one 
can only feel oneself being "part of the whole", with the State, 
phantom-like, existing above the parties.8   
 Wamba-dia-Wamba noted that in Africa, the one-party states 
followed quickly upon the newly independent multiparty states.  
For Arendt that is no surprise, and she surmises that one-party 
dictatorships are the last stage in the development of the 
nation-state in general, and the multiparty system in 
particular.  One-party rule rests on the seizure of power when 
one party receives a majority of votes.  Oftentimes such moves 
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are made in attempts to stabilize an otherwise ever-changing and 
unstable multiparty government.  Such actions also close the 
otherwise yawning gap between government and State.9   
 Arendt argues that two-party systems as in Britain and the 
U.S. have been more successful than multiparty setups.  This is 
because, in a two-party system, the party not in power consoles 
itself with the knowledge that it will be the "party of 
tomorrow."  Parties take turns constituting the government.  
Arendt notes, however, that such transitions can only go 
smoothly if the two parties agree fundamentally on a range of 
issues, so that temporary loss of power is not devastating.  
Arendt quotes Arthur Holcombe:  "If [the two parties] had not 
been substantially the same, submission to the victor would have 
been intolerable to the vanquished."10  This will mean that 
citizens have limited real choices in elections, with both 
parties being only  variations on a theme.   
 Moreover, it is difficult to purposely legislate two-party 
systems.  Technically, the U.S. is a multiparty government, 
since third (and fourth) parties are legal and have indeed been 
tried over the years.  Practically, it is a two-party system, 
since the two main parties capture the bulk of the vote.  But 
how can a newly constituted government insist that there should 
be only two parties and that they should take turns governing?  
Babangida tried to do so in Nigeria- he banned all parties 
except two which he created, the Social Democratic Party and the 
National Republican Convention, "in an attempt to reflect the 
American reality as much as possible, even in name."11  It is no 
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surprise when these forced attempts at party-creating do not 
work. 
 
One-party States 
 An early critic of the role of parties in independent 
Africa was Frantz Fanon.  In Wretched of the Earth, he recounts 
that the struggle for colonial independence and self-government, 
already problematic in many ways, was further complicated by the 
fact that the native bourgeoisie who wanted independence modeled 
themselves after the European party structures.  Fanon complains 
that the party mentality forced its framework in an a priori way 
upon the then existing structures.12  
 Fanon explains that the native elites believed that the 
party's role was to supervise the masses, "not in order to make 
sure that they really participate in the business of governing 
the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the 
government expects from them obedience and discipline."  The 
native bourgeoisie, in Fanon's words, first tried to govern 
"with the help of the people, but soon [governed] against 
them."13  
 Fanon describes the scenario whereby the native bourgeoisie 
creates its party, challenges all other parties, and then, once 
independence is granted, takes over, behaving much like the 
former rulers: 
The embryo opposition parties are liquidated by beatings or 
stonings.  The opposition candidates see their houses set 
on fire.  The police increase their provocations.  In these 
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conditions, you may be sure, the party is unchallenged and 
99.99% of the votes are cast for the government 
candidate... The party, instead of welcoming the expression 
of popular discontent, instead of taking for its 
fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the people 
up to the government, forms a screen, and forbids such 
ideas.  The party leaders behave like common sergeant-
majors, frequently reminding the people of the need for 
"silence in the ranks."  This party which used to call 
itself the servant of the people, which used to  claim that 
it worked for the full expression of the people's will, as 
soon as the colonial power puts the country into its 
control hastens to send the people back to their caves.14   
Fanon complains that the single party system dominates and 
bullies the people.  Even if the party system means well, and 
objectively progressive reforms are made, the rural masses won't 
support them, remaining suspicious of changes whose purpose has 
never been explained.  Here, we see Fanon, much like Arendt, 
critiquing the ruler-ruled system where the government gives 
orders and the people obey.  Instead, he advocates the 
revolutionary system of educating and organizing the people to 
rule themselves.  Fanon exhorts his Africa to quit playing a 
game of "catch-up" with Europe, and discover its own, more 
natural form of government.15   
 Wamba-dia-Wamba has a complementary criticism of one-party 
states.  He charges, as did Fanon before him, that neo-
colonialism is not independence.16  Parties, no matter how noble 
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their values, have as their goal the occupation of State 
positions rather than their destruction or transformation.  With 
a single party, people outside the party do not exist 
politically.17  He complains that no "revolutionary parties" have 
ever been truly emancipative.18  Here Wamba-dia-Wamba decisively 
defies the pigeonhole of "Marxist-Leninist" by rejecting the 
idea of salvation through the "vanguard party."  Instead, he 
notes that even Marxists have played the role of missionaries 
bringing "enlightenment" to Africa, and suggests that African 
Marxists do wrong when they treat Marxism as a technology to be 
applied to Africa like any other context.  Being an intellectual 
requires avoiding one-sidedness.  Instead of kowtowing to the 
Marxists or the capitalists, he insists that what Africans need 
is the revitalization of their capacity to think (especially 
free from the influence of donors).19  The importance of 
thinking, and of practicing "enlarged mentality," i.e., seeing a 
situation from multiple points of view, is similarly emphasized 
by Arendt.20 
 Fanon argues that liberation cannot be given as an act of 
charity by the former colonial masters through the IMF or other 
institutions.  Rather, it must be fought for.  However, this 
fight cannot take place in the Marxist-Leninist sense of a fight 
to control state power and install the correct people's party.  
He counsels against armed insurrection because, where it has 
been tried, as in Peru and Cambodia, "it is not winning."21  
Besides, such action only further reifies the State.  Africa has 
wrongly seen the State as the site of revolutionary power.  In 
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fact, to reduce politics to the State is to "abscond from 
politics."22  To understand Wamba-dia-Wamba's disillusion with 
the State as the place of political action, we need to focus on 
his idea of political action and ask where, if not in the State 
apparatus, such action can and should take place. 
 Let us begin with his description of political 
consciousness, characterized by its active, prescriptive 
relationship with reality.  The political attitude realizes that 
a given state of affairs need not remain so.  Indeed, he insists 
politics is a "creative invention," and so differs greatly from 
mere administration.23  This parallels Arendt's emphasis on 
natality, the human ability to begin something new and 
different, as central to action.24  However, Wamba-dia-Wamba 
cites not Arendt but Sylvain Lazarus, a professor of 
anthropology at the University of Paris, whose political theory 
involves "sites" and "militants," emerging or passing from 
existence depending on conditions.25  He uses village assemblies 
and councils, as well as a (sometimes national) "palavering 
community," as examples of sites for politics in Zaire/Congo.  
Lumumba first saw even parliament as a site for politics, but he 
quickly and increasingly "found himself a prisoner inside his 
own government," which was modeled on colonial state 
apparatuses.26  Historically, Wamba-dia-Wamba sees the Assembly 
in ancient Greece and the Convention in the French Revolution as 
examples of political sites.27  The sites serve as  centers for 
speech about issues central to a given community.  Ancient 
Greece, often considered paradigmatic of democracy, did not 
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structure itself as a multiparty government.  In the African 
context, he cites examples of the Palaver (ntungasani) which is 
"the collective open mutual self-questioning and self-criticism 
organized to resolve the crisis... every speaking person of the 
community called upon to discuss the affairs of the community." 
 He also refers to the Mbongi, "where male members of the 
lineage shared their daily needs, experiences, desires, worries 
and meals."28  He insists that "without those sites, politics 
ceases to exist."29   
 Wamba-dia-Wamba's examples of sites of politics parallel 
Arendt's descriptions of "public space," a necessary 
prerequisite for political action.  Political action in its 
paradigmatic, full sense entails sharing of opinions and ideas 
in public with one's peers, in a context where the goal of 
speech is disinterestedly (or unselfishly) promoting the common 
good of society.  Action is agreed upon by the community and 
done "in concert," avoiding ruler/ruled, command/obedience 
relationships among the citizens.  As d'Entreves explains, 
Arendt's conception of politics is based on "the idea of 
collective citizenship, that is, on the value and importance of 
civic engagement and collective deliberation about all matters 
affecting the political community."30  
 In Arendt's work, we see her scanning history for a few 
examples of such public gatherings and spaces of politics.  She 
finds them in some of the same places as Wamba-dia-Wamba, e.g., 
the Athenian agora and the Parisian councils.  However, Wamba-
dia-Wamba has added a particularly helpful dimension by giving 
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examples from Africa, which Arendt completely overlooked, 
probably due to Eurocentrism.31  Many accounts of African 
politics note the presence of both hierarchical and 
decentralized governmental models.  Some  decentralized models, 
such as the Igbo of Western Nigeria, could indeed serve as 
additional examples of public spaces.32  Some of Wamba-dia-
Wamba's examples from traditional Africa, which exclude women 
from the public space, are problematic, falling short of today's 
definitions of participatory democracy (as does, in fact, 
ancient Greece). However, Wamba-dia-Wamba explains that he is 
not for restoring tradition intact; rather, he wants movements 
to adapt promising features of tradition to today's needs. 
 It is important to note that Wamba-dia-Wamba does not use 
just any example from African political tradition as the 
paradigm for politics of the future.  He particularly seeks 
examples of peers associating in public gathering for free 
speech.  Therefore, he does not anywhere advocate an increased 
role for traditional chiefs, kings and Queen Mothers.  Despite 
recent arguments that such personages are actually democratic 
rather than aristocratic, due to their popular election and 
their mandate to serve the people, they are nonetheless at best 
representatives.33  Since his critique of the party system is a 
critique of representative democracy, in favor of the council 
system of direct people's participation, African kings and 
queens cannot interest Wamba-dia-Wamba as models, even if he 
accepts the evidence that they are representatives.  
 Arendt laments the diminishing of participatory democracy 
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and its replacement, by the party system, of people as actors 
with representatives who act for, on behalf, and therefore 
instead of the people.  As she explains, councils arose 
contemporaneously with parties.  However, their genesis is 
different.  Councils occur spontaneously during revolutions.  
Parties always precede or come after revolutions, bringing the 
issue of popular suffrage.  Councils challenged the party 
systems in all their forms.  Parties, as defined by Arendt, 
provide parliamentary government with support of the people 
through voting.  But parliaments, as representative bodies, take 
away people's chance to act politically themselves.34    
 Richard Bernstein explains Arendt's longstanding advocacy 
of councils and politics "from the bottom up" as due to her 
horror and frustrations with the lack of Jewish attempts to 
organize resistance to the Nazi holocaust.  She wanted the 
Jewish people to assume political responsibility and to fight 
against anti-Semitism.  An attitude of obedience to the 
government, no matter how cruel it was, helped to aid in the 
destruction of a people.35  Sitton points out, however, that 
Arendt's enthusiasm for councils was always limited to 
neighborhood councils, not workers' councils; she was concerned 
with territorial, not functional, units.  Through neighborhood 
councils, one could have a direct experience of politics; such 
an experience has value beyond the merely instrumental goals of 
politics.36    
 In contrast to councils, under a party system, the people, 
by voting, support, while the government acts.  For believers in 
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such a system, people's direct participation in public affairs, 
as in councils, signifies its decay or perversion.  The party 
system was supposed to represent; the people shouldn't need to 
do anything.  It thus becomes apparent that the party and 
council systems will always be at odds.37  One is reminded of 
Kaunda's claim as new President of independent Zambia, that the 
freedom fighters, whose special talent is to "communicate with 
the people" and motivate them "to act and suffer together," 
become somewhat obsolete once freedom is gained, for most 
government posts will be filled by degreed intellectuals trained 
in administration.38   
 With parties, Arendt complains, the relationship of the 
people to the party becomes one of buyer to seller.  In modern 
party government, "the voter can only consent or refuse to 
ratify a choice which... is made without him."  The party system 
reinforces inequality by replacing "government of the people by 
the people" with "government of the people by an elite sprung 
from the people."39  It is very questionable whether 
representatives, once voted into office, actually represent the 
wishes of their constituency.  Often, Arendt insists, the 
representatives satisfy desires that they themselves create.40  
     Arendt was disillusioned with voting and representational 
government.  In the 1970's, regarding politics in the United 
States (which is serving now as a model for all of Africa thanks 
to IMF/World Bank guidelines), she said, "Representative 
government itself is in a crisis today, partly because it has 
lost, in the course of time, all institutions that permitted the 
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citizens' actual participation, and partly because it is now 
gravely affected by the disease from which the system suffers:  
bureaucratization and the two parties' tendency to represent 
nobody except the party machines."  The "freedom to choose" 
found in voting is a very limited freedom.  Freedom in its 
fullest sense is found in action itself.  It consists in direct 
participation.  But in representative democracy, the only 
"freedom" citizens are offered is the choice of who will act for 
them and instead of them.  Voting is hardly an experience of 
free political action at all.  After the vote, the citizen goes 
back to being a private person until the next vote.41   
     As Arendt explained, the vote itself is no longer a sign of 
self-rule; the citizen has no power.  The most the vote can 
accomplish is to try to stop the abuse of power, now in the 
hands of the government.  Voters can get their interests 
represented, only through a kind of blackmail of the vote:  
large groups will refuse to vote for a representative unless he 
or she sides with them.  Or voters can hire lobbyists.  But that 
kind of power is very different from the power that arises out 
of joint action, where people accomplish things on their own as 
a community, instead of using their meager power to influence 
the minds and actions of elected officials.  In such a 
degenerate political situation, the people have two options:  
they will either react with lethargy, or with a spirit of 
resistance.42  This is not only a problem of the last few 
generations; Thomas Jefferson called the U.S. government as it 
was unfolding in his time "elective despotism", where the only 
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difference between it and despotism in general is that the 
people get to choose who will be the despots.  He warned that if 
people ever became inattentive to public affairs, the 
politicians would become wolves.43   
 Arendt describes some defenses recurringly used by party-
dominated governments, whether one-, two-, or multiparty 
systems, against councils and people's movements. First, 
existing channels and institutions (or as Arendt says, public 
spaces) which were based on participation were destroyed by 
violence.  Or, in the case of the United States, where violence 
wasn't used, overlooked and omitted from the Constitution.  
Then, after the party system asserts itself as the only 
government, the apathy (or fear) it generates among the people 
makes it easy for the party system to stay in power.  People 
remain isolated from each other, give up on public happiness, 
and look for happiness in their private lives instead.  Thus it 
is not the apathy of citizens that makes the government resort 
to representation, but the reverse: the imposition of the party 
system on people encourages them to be apathetic. 
 The above critique is not a complaint that individual party 
members, or particular parties, are corrupt, inept, or 
inefficient; it is a more sweeping condemnation of 
representation as a political form.  I suggest that just this 
kind of critique underlies Wamba-dia-Wamba's criticism of 
multiparty government.  As he complains regarding Zaire/Congo, 
political reforms there "aimed at constructing a parliamentary 
state with or without the people's involvement... Rules for 
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rules' sake, courtesy, etc., were considered more important than 
political truths..."44  Reforms were inadequate because Mobutu's 
opponents did not have an adequate grasp of just how wrong 
things were.  Criticizing the Mobutu regime as "dictatorship" 
and "personalized state," they didn't realize that "the mere 
disappearance of Mobutu will not destroy his regime."45  The 
ruling class wanted a parliamentary form of the state "stripped 
of Mobutuiste militarism and extravagances of personal exercise 
of power, but not necessarily of its Western sponsorship."  
Their goal was limited- to make the rules of accumulation fairer 
than they had been under Mobutu.  For Wamba-dia-Wamba, these 
aspirations fall short of what Zaire/Congo really needs:  
sovereignty or emancipation for its people, be they peasants, 
workers, students, women or children.46  Now that Mobutu is gone, 
there is renewed opportunity for people's movements, but due to 
their prior oppression and isolation, it may take a while before 
the people regain their practice of political action.   
 That Western powers had been satisfied with the "reforms" 
in Zaire/Congo proves the need to distinguish democracy as 
imperialist policy from democracy as people's political capacity 
for self-control.47  (1993:98)  Wamba-dia-Wamba charges that 
supporters of capitalism, in charge of IMF/World Bank funds, 
have reduced the notion of democratic transition to 
multipartyism, democratic constitution, and laissez-faire 
polices, without giving a single example of how such procedures 
have "...led to social and political self-emancipation of the 
People.  It is merely assumed that the process will eventually 
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lead to self-emancipation."48  
 Wamba-dia-Wamba has defined democratization as "a process 
of struggles to win, defend and protect rights of people 
(producers, women, minorities) and individuals, against one-
sidedness...  including the right of self-organization for 
autonomy and not necessarily the right of participation in the 
state process."49  By his definition he has shown that he 
considers empty democratic "form" to be worthless if it is not 
resulting in emancipation for the people.  On this point he has 
had some critics.  Tobias Louw is concerned that the palaver-
methods of resolving conflict in indigenous communities may not 
be practical for "... the more functionalistic demands and 
styles of life (determined by criteria such as utility, 
competitiveness, productivity and efficiency)."50  Jan Hoogland 
cautions that with any actually functioning democratic system 
there will be problems with living up to an ideal standard.  So 
the gap between African governments and the democratic ideal 
must not be completely condemned but rather understood as an 
example of the usual gap between ideal and reality.51  But Wamba-
dia-Wamba does not interpret the Euro-American and IMF/ World 
Bank interest in establishing multiparty democracy in Africa as 
an example of a humble attempt to improve government that will 
eventually result in a more perfect democracy.  Rather he refers 
to the "triumphalist imposition of monopolization" in which 
Western powers now indulge after the end of the Cold War.  He 
also notes that:  "While the West consumes about 2/3 of World 
resources, there is increasingly no normative desire or attempt 
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to democratize the situation."52  Such observations reveal the 
hypocrisy of the Western advocacy of democracy. 
   
Realistic Alternatives to Party Representation? 
     Many of the governments Arendt endorses did have 
representatives of some sort.  The early colonies that Arendt 
praises as not being governments of rulers and the ruled had 
their own representatives, "freely chosen by the consent of 
loving friends and neighbors."  And in the popular societies of 
France, which she also praised, there were elected presidents.  
So Arendt does not oppose representatives as such, but the 
representative structure as it exists today.53   
     Although there is no place for rulership in Arendt's 
politics, there is a place for leadership.  A leader is 
sensitive to the fact that most things cannot be accomplished by 
a lone individual; the group effort aspect of any action is 
admitted and emphasized.  No matter how brilliant one's ideas 
are, other collaborators are needed to bring those ideas to 
fruition.  A leader will want input from others to improve or 
criticize the plans. 
     Arendt says that the problem with today's political "elite" 
is that it is chosen according to standards that are profoundly 
unpolitical.  Party systems discourage authentically political 
talents.  True politicians can hardly survive "the petty 
maneuvers of party politics."  Today's politicians are primarily 
salespeople, with the virtues of good salespeople.  She holds up 
as a paradigm the "elite" of the council system, but she 
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distinguishes it from any elite that had ever gone before: 
The councils were also an elite, they were even the only 
political elite, of the people and sprung from the people, 
the modern world has ever seen, but they were not nominated 
from above or supported from below.  With respect to the 
elementary councils that sprang up wherever people lived or 
worked together, one is tempted to say that they had 
selected themselves; those who organized themselves were 
those who cared and those who took the initiative; they 
were the political elite of the people brought into the 
open by the revolution.  From these `elementary republics', 
the councilmen then chose their deputies for the next 
higher council, and these deputies, again, were selected by 
their peers, they were not subject to any pressure either 
from above or from below.  Their title rested on nothing 
but the confidence of their equals.54   
 Here Arendt describes the paradigm for a representative 
government that is not repressive.  Although it probably results 
in a pyramid-shaped government, which is the shape of any 
authoritative government, the authority is structured totally 
differently from most governments:   
But while, in all authoritarian government we know of, 
authority is filtered down from above, in this case 
authority would have been generated neither at the top nor 
at the bottom, but on each of the pyramid's layers; and 
this obviously could constitute the solution to one of the 
most serious problems of all modern politics, which is not 
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how to reconcile freedom and equality but how to reconcile 
authority and equality.55   
In Arendt's alternative scenario, the people are full 
participants.  The authority of their own local government 
arises from the fact that the people have agreed upon these 
issues and made mutually binding promises.  Their government 
needs no other authority than that:  as with the Mayflower 
compact, a basis of mutual promise and compact is sufficient.56   
     Is this juster form of representative government possible, 
or is it all a dream?  Arendt insists that it has happened 
several times in history.  A good example is Hungary in 1956.  
Councils of all sorts- writers', artists', workers', etc.- 
within a few days began a process of coordination and 
integration, creating higher councils.  Then delegates to the 
assembly were chosen.  It was a perfect example of the federal 
principle:  a league and alliance among separate units.  This 
organization sprang up naturally, and was not premeditated or 
chosen because of worries about large territories.  According to 
Arendt, human beings are political animals, and this self-
government springs up spontaneously when people are given a 
chance to express themselves politically.57   
 To supplement Arendt's examples, Wamba-dia-Wamba has a vast 
array drawn from indigenous governments in Africa.  Many 
community practices are intact.  African communities would not 
be starting from scratch, were they to try today to find an 
alternative to the party system.  Other African thinkers have 
argued similar points.  For example, Anthony Appiah cites an 
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interesting example from Ghana, where the central, top-down 
government collapsed for a while in the mid-1970's.  Appiah 
notes that if Hobbes were right, without the "Leviathan" to keep 
order, people would begin killing each other.  Instead, 
voluntary associations, along lines that Arendt would admire, 
stepped in and took over the business that had been relegated to 
government.  Indeed, such societies are always active, calling 
into question the indispensability of the "modern State."  
Appiah notes that in rural Ghana, "disputes are more likely to 
end up in arbitration, between the heads of families, or in the 
court of 'traditional' chiefs and queen mothers;" most even 
preferred such contexts to the colonial-based legal system.  
Churches have been more instrumental than the State in 
financing, building, staffing and equipping schools and 
hospitals in response to community needs.  They also maintained 
homes for orphans and the mentally ill.  Chiefs and elders have 
organized the maintenance of "public" roads, and mediated 
between labor and management in industrial disputes.  He cites 
these examples to show that the general populace is not 
apathetic and immobilized.  However, his example gives as much 
credit to voluntary associations as to alternative hierarchical 
models which were still intact and operating throughout the 
years of both colonialism and independence.58  Whether African 
"representatives," such as chiefs, kings, and Queen Mothers, 
have been chosen or elected in such a manner as to fit Wamba-
dia-Wamba or Arendt's paradigms of not just representative, but 
actual participatory democracy, is a complex issue better 
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explored in a separate work.  Let it suffice for now to note 
that Kwame Gyekye, speaking of the Akan chieftaincy, grants it 
some democratic features, while suggesting that some aspects of 
traditional rulership "are disharmonious with the modern 
situation."59   
 What about Museveni's recent attempts to create non-party 
democracy in Uganda?   Oloka-Onyango explains that instead of 
party politics, Museveni and the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) hoped to build a broad-based government of national unity. 
 Political party activity was suspended, supposedly to prevent 
the resurgence of sectarianism.  Grassroots resistance 
committees were created to replace the parties.  However, Oloka-
Onyango complains that the resistance committees have usurped 
and abused judicial powers.  More to the point, he complains 
that the involvement of the masses in the machinery of 
government has remained marginal.60  Under external pressure for 
a party system, parties were allowed, but for the 1994 
Constituent Assembly elections and the 1996 presidential poll, 
elections were held on a non-party basis and candidates had to 
stand independently.  Still, one wonders if the "No change" 
slogan which got Museveni re-elected recently could be any 
further from Arendt's espousal of "natality" as the ability to 
do something new.  Certainly, election observers noted that the 
fear of a reign of terror, still a vivid memory for most 
Ugandans, played a role in the popularity of the "no change" 
ideology.61  Although multiparties may be a problem, perhaps 
heads of state aren't the ones to declare by fiat that there 
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will be no parties, only participatory democracy.  Doesn't the 
movement have to come from the people?  
 
Conclusion 
 While Wamba-dia-Wamba believes that the State is dying in 
Africa, he does not see multiparty democracy as the solution.  
Rather, one must reconstruct the State from the point of view of 
emancipative politics.62  He insists that, first, there must be 
politics outside the parties.  Both the former one-party 
governments and their present multiparty forms must go.  He 
charges that "Multi-single vanguard partyism- proposed by former 
Party-State countries... that deny the existence of politics 
outside the parties, is only an extended authoritarianism."63  
Indeed, even in current newly-formed multiparty states like 
Kenya, not all political parties are registered, and political 
activity outside of registered parties is prohibited.  As a 
concession to practicality, he admits that multiparty government 
is worth fighting for as it is an important stage toward 
emancipative politics.  But the only practical purpose of 
multiparty government is to ensure a free space in which genuine 
political action in the form of people's movements could begin 
to express itself.  The danger of being involved in multiparty 
struggles is the complacency and misguided notions of thinking 
one has reached democracy as soon as parties are allowed.  
   Wamba-dia-Wamba recognizes that his rejection of Party and 
State goes against the grain.  Political philosophy as a whole, 
he states, citing A. Skillen, is "based on theorizing the 
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justification of the idea that there must be some dominating 
others for society to achieve its natural grounding.  
Fundamentally a celebration of the State per se."64  Wamba-dia-
Wamba should therefore rejoice that he has not been alone in 
denouncing such a conception.  Arendt's works have championed 
the council system for decades.  Of course, Wamba-dia-Wamba adds 
an invaluable dimension by pointing out the African precursors 
and examples of council as a form of non-oppressive government. 
 He also helps by drawing our attention to the need to look at 
such models in the contemporary African context.  He would also, 
undoubtedly, want to take Arendt to task, as other Marxists did, 
for her rigid separation between political and economic matters. 
 Indeed, the people do want bread.  But Arendt would be consoled 
by his insistence that the African people do not want only 
bread, but also and importantly, political practice and self-
determination. 
 Although several scholars have been prompted to reply 
specifically to Wamba-dia-Wamba's challenging ideas, none seems 
to have captured the heart of his criticism.  Julius Ihonvbere, 
stating that he disagrees with Wamba-dia-Wamba, may have missed 
the latter's point.  Ihonvbere argues that Wamba-dia-Wamba 
should not be so pessimistic about the party system; that just 
because some parties have been corrupt and money-grabbing, that 
is no reason to give up on parties.  In fact, he suggests that 
the future of Africa needs good political parties, 
democratically formed with capable leadership.  Ideally, 
multiple parties serve as checks and balances on each other 
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while serving "as outlets for the expression of different 
political interests and ideologies."  Since he doesn't advance 
any ideas of how parties would avoid bolstering the State, which 
Wamba-dia-Wamba says should be radically altered, Ihonvbere 
gives the impression of slighting the profundity of Wamba-dia-
Wamba's analysis.  However, Ihonvbere does express his pessimism 
regarding "the masses," suggesting that they often support 
corrupt politicians and themselves aspire to ill-gotten wealth, 
since their work ethic has been destroyed.65  Here he seems to 
allude to a "vicious circle" in which citizens, no longer 
assured that corruption can be stamped out, console themselves 
with the thought that they may be able to position themselves to 
soon take advantage of such corruption.  However, his 
concentration on the vicious circle makes Ihonvbere's stance on 
parties a "pragmatic, take-reality-as-it-is" approach which 
counts more on well-meaning elites than easily duped citizens.  
Has this "realistic" vision sold the people short? 
 Indeed, Arendt claims that representation is no check 
against corruption, since the electorate can't be trusted to 
vote corruption out of office.66  Interestingly enough, Ihonvbere 
uses evidence like this to support cynicism about people's 
movements, rather than about people as voters.  Arendt, while 
cautioning about the dangers of "mass movements" like Fascism 
and Nazism (where people think alike so much, it becomes proof 
they aren't thinking at all), maintains her belief and optimism 
that the people can think and act, thereby being able to form 
and participate in their own government.  As Leah Bradshaw 
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explains, Arendt wanted to believe that the apparent rarity of 
thought in "the masses" was contingent, due to the decline of 
the public realm and cloistered professionalism.67   
 Another commentator, partly supportive of Wamba-dia-Wamba's 
criticisms of the importation of Western notions of democracy, 
nevertheless takes him to task for proposing a non-State or 
anti-State solution.  Marie Pauline Eboh argues that while it 
may be true that colonial powers arbitrarily grouped peoples 
together into states, to propose a non-state solution would 
plunge Africa into countless wars of independence in which the 
result might be each ethnic group in Africa constituting its own 
country.68  This argument also seems to misunderstand Wamba-dia-
Wamba's criticisms, for to have independent states which 
received their identity and legitimacy from a homogeneous 
culture within its boundaries is indeed still an example of the 
nation-state on European political models which he rejects.  
However, Eboh does conclude by sharing a sentiment that would 
readily be embraced by Wamba-dia-Wamba, when she asserts:  "The 
fact that no country has yet acquired true democracy, argues in 
favor of intercultural fecundation of democracy.  Maybe in 
integrating the good aspects of the democratic processes of 
every society, the world may yet evolve a better brand of 
democracy."69 
 Wamba-dia-Wamba and Arendt's ideal, as such, may seem 
impracticable.  With all the world's political and economic 
forces behind multiparty democracy, it is perhaps quixotic to 
imagine Africa will resist and forge its own, truer, politics, 
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leaving other countries far behind, stuck in an "adolescent 
stage" of repressive representative politics.  However, 
impractical as it may be, it is important on the theoretical 
level to clarify how far our present reality is from the ideal 
of politics.  And, if a people's movement along the lines 
suggested by Arendt and Wamba-dia-Wamba were to emerge, their 
ideas would help us recognize its worth and support it, rather 
than squelching it in favor of a party structure.  As Arendt 
notes, the reason the United States so soon diverged from 
treasuring political action, as found in its town halls, was 
that it hadn't realized the preciousness of its treasure.  It 
easily traded in public happiness, based on political 
participation, for private happiness, based on personal 
acquisition unhindered by politics.  The latter may be all that 
some leaders of opposition parties want, but Wamba-dia-Wamba 
thinks the African people want more; perhaps by reinvigorating 
their traditions of palaver and mbongi, they will get it, and 
become a role model for the rest of us. 
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